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Abstract: 
For years, managers have tried to improve organizational performance through business process transformation (BPT), 
and their experiences have informed IS research and practice. Although extant theory acknowledges the political nature 
of these dynamic transformation initiatives, researchers have yet to empirically investigate and theorize how 
organizational politics impacts BPT behaviors and outcomes. Drawing on a pluralist methodology, we present an 
embedded case study of a company-wide BPT project across four business units at the high-tech firm Terma. First, we 
apply different perspectives on organizational politics to develop detailed accounts of each business unit's response to 
the transformation initiative, which reveals four distinct patterns of BPT politics: “applying the hammer”, “struggling to 
engage”, “walking the talk”, and “keeping up appearances”. Next, we combine the empirical findings with extant literature 
to theorize how transformation agents and process users engage in politics during BPT implementation. As a result, our 
research leverages a pluralist approach to show how alternative political perspectives and forms of politics can help 
managers maneuver BPT initiatives in their roles as transformation agents and process users. 
Keywords: Business Process Transformation, Organizational Politics, Power, Pluralist Approach, Embedded Case 
Study. 
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1 Introduction 
Business process transformation (BPT) is the latest strand in a long tradition of improving business 
performance through adopting technology and implementing new ways of managing, organizing, and 
executing work (Grover & Markus, 2008). As such, BPT requires alignment of IS with business needs on 
the one hand and with transformation goals on the other. BPT is a particular form of organizational change 
that requires one to use IS for process-transformation purposes and that reinforces the complex interplay 
between technology and people-related issues. As an important area of IS research (Broadbent, Weill, 
Clair, & Kearney, 1999; Kettinger, Teng, & Guha, 1997; Lee, Wyner, & Pentland, 2008; Mani, Barua, & 
Whinston, 2010; Venkatesh & Bala, 2012), BPT covers both incremental and radical transformation 
initiatives (Davenport, 1993; Venkatraman, 1994), which the literature refers to as continuous 
improvement (Deming, 1986) and process innovation (Deming, 1986; Hammer & Champy, 1993). 
There is overwhelming evidence that BPT breeds political tensions (Grint, Case, & Willcocks, 1995; 
Kelley, 1976; Knights & McCabe, 1999, 2002) and that organizational actors, therefore, need to 
understand and engage in BPT politics to promote their interests and to respond appropriately to 
stakeholders (Buchanan, 1997; Dhillon, 2004; Grover, Lederer, & Sabherwal, 1988). However, extant 
research has not adequately leveraged theory on power and politics to empirically investigate BPT. 
Although the literature offers a variety of heuristics and lessons (Brown, 1998; Kautz, Hansen, & Thaysen, 
2001; Willcocks & Smith, 1995), no theories focus on understanding and managing BPT implementation 
politics. This knowledge gap is a problem in light of industry reports that show that organizational politics 
prevents one-third of BPT efforts from becoming successful (Gartner, 2012). 
In response, we analyzed behaviors and outcomes as the Danish high-tech firm Terma implemented a 
corporate-wide BPT project over a two-year period. Four of Terma’s business units—Aerostructures 
(AES), Airborne Systems (ASY), Integrated Systems (ISY), and Radar Systems (RSY)—undertook this 
project to address problems of keeping systems development efforts on schedule and within budget, and 
to respond to customers’ demand for the company to document business process maturity. Observing 
significant differences in how the project was impacted by and dealt with power and politics, we explain 
the observed behaviors and outcomes based on a pluralist approach in which we apply multi-perspective 
analyses to reveal political tensions and maneuvering and to verbalize, synthesize, and extend the ways 
we think about politics in IT-based BPT implementations (Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991; Lapointe & 
Rivard, 2005, 2007; Mingers, 2001). As such, we relied on multiple research methods to capture how 
complex political processes manifested and unfolded over time (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Mingers & 
Brocklesby, 1997). These methods included the first author’s engagement as an employee and action 
researcher at Terma (Mathiassen, 2002; Susman & Evered, 1978), our adopting an embedded case study 
design to report the empirical findings (Yin, 2003), and our advancing new theory through a pluralist 
approach inspired by metatriangulation (Lewis & Grimes, 1999). 
As a result, our research complements existing studies that attempt to explain variations in IS 
implementation across business units in an organization based on how actors engage in and respond to 
such effort to further their own interests (Barley, 1986; Robey & Sahay, 1996). Hence, following Gregor 
(2006), we provide analyses and descriptions of BPT politics and prescriptions for managing BPT politics 
in response to the following research question: 
RQ: How can knowledge of organizational politics help one understand and manage business 
process transformation behaviors and outcomes? 
We acknowledge that the concepts one uses shapes how one understands politics and that one should 
not view it as a one-dimensional concept. Hence, we base our investigations on Bradshaw-Camball and 
Murray’s (1991) framework of pluralist1, rationalist, interpretive, and radical politics—each representing 
competing sociological paradigms. Our application of multiple perspectives fostered both empirical and 
theoretical insights and resulted in two distinct contributions to the literature. First, we present rich, 
contextual accounts of BPT politics in each of Terma’s business units and identify four distinct patterns of 
politics: “applying the hammer”, “struggling to engage”, “walking the talk”, and “keeping up appearances”. 
Second, we theorize the interplay between transformation agent and process user politics during BPT 
implementation as reflecting shifts in the alignment of process needs and compliance with transformation 
                                                     
1 Note: we use the term “pluralist” here based on Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) categorization of sociological paradigms, and it differs 
from the concept of “pluralism” in reference to multi-perspective, multi-method approaches to conducting research. 
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goals. Hence, although extant theory acknowledges the political nature of technology-enabled change 
efforts (Jasperson et al., 2002), our research is the first in the IS field to systematically adopt a pluralist 
approach to empirically investigate and theorize how organizational politics impacts behaviors and 
outcomes in such initiatives. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we review the literature on organizational politics related to 
BPT implementation. In Section 3, we describe Bradshaw-Camball and Murray’s (1991) framework that 
we used to analyze the BPT implementation at Terma. In Section 4, we describe our research 
methodology and in Section 5, we summarize the empirical findings. In Section 6, we discuss our findings 
and develop new theory based on the empirical findings and extant literature. In Section 7, we conclude 
the paper by discussing its theoretical contributions and managerial implications. In particular, we advise 
managers to proactively maneuver BPT efforts by considering their intrinsic political nature rather than 
passively reacting to political moves. 
2 Organizational Politics and BPT  
In this section, we first outline the characteristics of BPT as a particular technology-enabled form of 
organizational change. We then delineate BPT politics as a literature stream in the intersection between 
organization and IS theory. Finally, we describe state-of-the-art knowledge on politics in BPT. 
2.1 BPT 
BPT is a collective name for ongoing, cross-functional, process-focused change initiatives. Because such 
initiatives are information intensive, coordination and information management constitute their main 
challenges. Handling these challenges requires one to align processes, information, and systems as work 
practices change by adopting IT to accommodate emerging information needs. BPT is the latest strand of 
management approaches to organizational innovation; others include business process reengineering 
(BPR), total quality management (TQM), Six Sigma, lean, software process improvement (SPI), and a 
variety of industry-specific maturity models (Hackman & Wageman, 1995; Hammer, 1990; Müller, 
Mathiassen, & Balshøj, 2010; Tennant, 2001; Womack, Jones, & Roos, 2007). Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI) (CMMI Product Team, 2010) is a widely used BPT approach for reducing costs, 
increasing speed, and improving quality of software and systems development. The five CMMI levels of 
maturity signal technical competence in well-defined areas. In general, BPT is an IT-based approach to 
organizational innovation and spans a continuum of incremental and radical approaches (Davenport, 
1993; Deming, 1986; Hammer & Champy, 1993). More specifically, it is an organization-wide approach 
that “requires redesigns in which IT, business processes, and other organizational elements are aligned 
and jointly optimized” (Grover & Markus, 2008, p. 8). Compared to other management approaches, BPT 
takes a broad perspective by paying attention to intra- and inter-organizational business processes with a 
focus on redesigning the use of IS to manage knowledge. Further, it heralds an evolution from first- to 
second-generation process management—from “a radical, intra-organizational, IT-led, mechanistic, and 
inspirational approach” to “a contingent, interorganizational, IT-enabled, holistic, and systematic approach” 
(Grover & Markus, 2008, p. 45). 
BPT is highly relevant to IS researchers (Broadbent et al., 1999; Kettinger et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2008; 
Mani et al., 2010; Venkatesh & Bala, 2012) because of its information- and technology-intensive nature 
that entails organizational use of IS to support coordination and management. Extant research on BPT is 
informed by various strands of IS literature that emphasize the need to consider technical, organizational, 
social, and managerial aspects of organizational change. In particular, state-of-the-art BPT literature 
shows that a “lack of attention to social-political and organizational issues are major reasons” (Grover & 
Markus, 2008, p. 50) for why BPT projects fail. Recognizing that BPT is an IT-based approach to 
organizational innovation, we review the literature at the intersection between politics in organization and 
IS theory (see Figure 1). We draw on both literature streams to take stock of state-of-the-art knowledge of 
BPT implementations: triggers of BPT politics, politicking during BPT, and the impact of politics on BPT 
(see Table 1). 
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Figure 1. Research on Politics in BPT 
 
Table 1. Knowledge of BPT Politics 
Triggers Politicking Impact 
Conflicting (self-)interests Negotiating competing interests Power redistribution 
Turf guarding and identity threats 
Framing communication and 
information flows through 
narratives 
Transformed organizational 
structures 
Fear of transparency 
Mobilizing discursive and 
symbolic resources 
Transfer of influence to managers 
Threats to existing political 
structures and power relations 
Designing solutions aligned with 
goals, power, and culture 
Equalization of power and 
influence 
Managerial oppression of labor 
and increased control 
Management of organizational 
responses 
Transformed interorganizational 
relationships 
2.2 Politics 
For decades, scholars have been interested in organizational politics (Drory & Romm, 1990) as a 
multidisciplinary research topic that encourages one to apply different perspectives (Bachrach & Baratz, 
1962; Jasperson et al., 2002). Definitions of power and politics abound (Drory & Romm, 1990). Pfeffer 
(1981, p. 7), for example, refers to power as the capacity to influence (e.g., by controlling information) and 
to politics as the use of power (e.g., by disclosing information). Individuals and groups may engage in 
organizational politics to construct, reproduce, and change organizational and technological realities 
(Knights & Murray, 1994). Many scholars see political behavior as “an accepted rather than an 
objectionable dimension of the change agency role” (Buchanan & Badham, 1999, p. 609). However, the 
impact depends on actors’ ability to mobilize and use various resources, including expertise, information, 
political access, and informal networks (Krackhardt, 1990; Pettigrew, 1975; Schein, 1985). Moreover, 
organizational politics is a catalyst for (Knights & Murray, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983) and a consequence of 
organizational change (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1981), and it concerns opposition to managerial 
intervention and the management and prevention of conflict (Hardy, 1996). Lastly, Drory and Romm 
(1990) suggest that organizational politics is dynamic in nature and that a combination of elements 
(namely, the presence of influence, use of informal means in the pursuit of outcomes, and conflict) 
characterize it (Drory & Romm, 1990). 
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Extant research has identified numerous triggers (see Table 1) of organizational politics in BPT initiatives. 
In fact, BPT breeds politics (Grint et al., 1995; Kelley, 1976; Knights & McCabe, 1999; Knights & McCabe, 
2002) despite claims to the contrary (Knights & McCabe, 1998) and attempts at replacing conflicts with 
shared goals (Knights & McCabe, 2002). According to Keen (1981, p. 24), IT-based transformations “alter 
relationships, patterns of communication and perceived influence, authority, and control”. When 
stakeholders challenge existing power relations as they try to further their self-interests, BPT becomes an 
increasingly political activity in which outcomes remain uncertain (Grover et al., 1988; Knights & McCabe, 
1999; McCabe, Knights, & Wilkinson, 1998). 
2.3 BPT Politics 
Stakeholders resist management-led initiatives such as BPT for numerous reasons (van Offenbeek, 
Boonstra, & Seo, 2013; Rivard & Lapointe, 2012), including conflicting interests (Boudreau & Robey, 
1996), politicized solutions based on self-interest (Buchanan, 1997), turf-guarding and identity threats 
(Goldenson & Herbsleb, 1995; Grover et al., 1988; Stelzer & Mellis, 1998), fear of vulnerability due to 
increased transparency and data accessibility (Hart & Saunders, 1997), and threats to existing political 
structures (Currie & Willcocks, 1996; Lapointe & Rivard, 2005, 2007) and expert power (Wilkinson & 
Witcher, 1993) (Table 1). Although IT-enabled change may involve participation and collaboration across 
organizations, some stakeholders resist BPT when it threatens existing power structures. “Simply put, 
power trumps technology” (Watson, Akselsen, Evjemo, & Aarsæther,1999, p. 63). From an employee 
perspective, BPT may indeed be seen as a “managerial attempt to oppress labor” (Boudreau & Robey, 
1996, p. 52), and managers may hide the real purpose of a BPT initiative “by justifying actions on rational 
grounds and honoring the appropriate organizational rituals” (Franz & Robey, 1984, p. 1203). Hiding 
behind rhetoric about empowerment and efficiency, managers may implement systems that increase 
transparency and, subsequently, their control over business processes and employees. Consequently, 
employees may engage in politics to not only resist and guard their turfs but also constructively protect 
existing work practices against management-led BPT initiatives (Keen, 1981; Nielsen & Nørbjerg, 2001a, 
2001b). From a bird’s eye perspective, BPT initiatives are vehicles for ongoing struggles between 
competing groups and individuals that may reinforce or challenge existing power relations (Knights & 
McCabe, 1999; McCabe, 2000). Similarly, BPT initiatives may reflect competing institutional interests as 
“the institutional power to influence and regulate can be linked to ideologies governing supply-push and 
demand-pull approaches to innovation” (King et al., 1994, p. 162). 
With regard to politicking (Table 1), multiple stakeholders enact organizational politics during BPT (Keen, 
1981; McCabe et al., 1998). Therefore, managers need both technical and political skills to balance and 
negotiate competing stakeholder interests, garner support, build commitment, and ensure the legitimacy 
of chosen solutions (Buchanan, 1997; Dhillon, 2004; Schein, 1985). Management must deal explicitly with 
conflicts and engage proactively in politicking to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes. 
Otherwise, a power vacuum may emerge in which self-interests may undermine publicly announced goals 
and values (Levine & Rossmoore, 1994). As various stakeholder groups engage in politicking, managers 
must “recognize and deal with the politics of data and the likelihood, even legitimacy, of 
counterimplementation” (Keen, 1981, p. 24). Employees may support BPT when they perceive that it suits 
their needs (Nidumolu, Goodman, Vogel, & Danowitz, 1996, p. 208). Different stakeholder groups may 
use narratives to further their interests during BPT (Brown, 1998), and they may frame communication 
and information flows to manipulate perceptions of an initiative (Brown, 1995). In fact, socio-political 
actions centered on the mobilization of discursive and symbolic resources are inherent to BPT 
implementations (Bloomfield & Danieli, 1995, p. 23). Although one may minimize resistance by 
experimenting with and designing solutions in accordance with organizational goals, power distribution, 
and culture (Kautz et al., 2001; Lapointe & Rivard, 2005, 2007; Markus, 1983; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983), 
BPT is subject to different interpretations depending on key stakeholders’ roles and interests. 
Stakeholders may influence the change effort differently depending on their interests in reducing 
uncertainty and supporting organizational goals (Sillince & Harindranath, 1998). Accordingly, Willcocks 
and Smith (1995) suggest three specific politicking tactics for managing BPT: 1) regularly carry out power 
audits and determine the feasibility of various transformation mechanisms, 2) monitor politics and identify 
changing opinions and shifting moods, and 3) mobilize power to ensure proper momentum and counter 
opposition (Willcocks & Smith, 1995). 
By shaping the transformation process, organizational politics inevitably impacts BPT outcomes (Table 1). 
Focusing on the role of IT in BPT, research highlights how transformation initiatives impact organizational 
structures and power distributions (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Saunders, 1981), which, in turn, challenges 
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implementation (Cavaye & Christiansen, 1996; Markus, 1981, 1983). The use of IS such as group support 
systems (GSS) is an illustrative example of how BPT impacts power distributions. On the one hand, GSS 
may transfer influence to managers whose own agendas may intentionally or unintentionally motivate their 
own actions (Griffith, Fuller, & Northcraft, 1998). On the other hand, such technologies may: 
exert an equalizing force on power and influence by 1) increasing participation in the decision-
making process, 2) improving access to information, 3) improving access to persons, 4) 
reducing the ‘power distance’ to key individuals, and 5) providing increased opportunities to 
influence the opinion of others. (Williams & Wilson, 1997, p. 911) 
IS support for business processes may also influence interorganizational relationships. For example, one 
can coercively use supply chain management systems to increase one’s level of control over trading 
partners (Hart & Saunders, 1997), and one may consciously adopt such interorganizational systems for 
that purpose (Premkumar & Ramamurthy, 1995). 
In summary, BPT is a management approach to organizational innovation (Grover & Markus, 2008). 
However, BPT challenges existing power relations, and organizational politics shapes both behaviors and 
outcomes. Thus, BPT is a highly uncertain socio-technical activity, and stakeholders need to understand 
and engage in organizational politics as they implement, adapt to, and use the technology. Although the 
literature offers a variety of managerial heuristics and lessons (Brown, 1998; Kautz et al., 2001; Willcocks 
& Smith, 1995) and demonstrates how to apply discourse theory to understand BPT politics (Knights & 
McCabe, 1998, 1999, 2002), no theory on BPT implementation politics exists. Buchanan and Badham 
(1999) lament “the limited value of checklists of ‘power tactics’ found in some of the politics literature” 
(Buchanan & Badham, 1999, p. 624). 
3 Four Perspectives on Organizational Politics 
Bradshaw-Camball and Murray (1991) propose three perspectives on organizational politics that represent 
different sociological paradigms: functional, interpretive, and radical (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Furthermore, they distinguish between two main schools of thought in the functional perspective: the 
pluralist and rationalist. The well-cited Jasperson et al. (2002) article applies the pluralist, rationalist, 
interpretive, and radical perspectives in its review of the IS literature on politics, which suggests that this 
multi-perspective framework offers a comprehensive view of power and politics in IS research. Of the 82 
papers the authors review, they place five in the radical, 15 in the interpretive, 39 in the rationalist, and 42 
in the pluralist perspective, which underscores the importance of distinguishing between the two 
functionalist schools. Hence, we use the four theoretical perspectives as alternative analytical lenses for 
understanding important aspects of organizational politics. Well-aligned with our pluralist research 
methodology, the Bradshaw-Camball and Murray (1991) framework is unique in offering competing 
perspectives that allow one to investigate the complexities and multi-faceted nature of organizational 
politics in depth. Table 2 summarizes the alternative perspectives, the role of key concepts in 
understanding politics, and references to IS studies that apply them. In this study, we focus on structure 
(e.g., who the political agents are, what their interests are, what means of influence they have), process 
(e.g., how this influence is exercised), and outcome (e.g., what the consequences are). 
From a pluralist perspective, organizations comprise people who pursue personal interests with less 
regard for organizational goals (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Conflicts are an intrinsic and inescapable part of 
organizational life. However, they can play a constructive role by highlighting different opinions, identifying 
potential problems, and garnering acceptance of joint undertakings. Power is a source of and a means to 
resolve conflicts among individuals and groups through negotiation and coalition formation. The pluralist 
perspective draws attention to the physical, concrete manifestations of politics by asking: “Who are the 
key players in the game (stakeholders), how much power do they have, and what basis of power do they 
utilize?”. (Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991, p. 381). Stakeholders recognize and use sources of 
power—such as relationships, information, and control of critical resources—in political game playing. In 
terms of outcomes of political game playing, stakeholders use their power and resources, and often ignore 
broader organizational ramifications. An advantage of the pluralist perspective is that it draws “attention to 
the surface, revealing more conscious conflicts and bases of power” (Martin, 1992, cited in Lewis & 
Kelemen, 2002, p. 266). It deals with “evolutionary as opposed to catastrophic change” (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979, p. 359). Hart and Saunders (1997) in their investigation of the role that power and trust play in EDI 
adoption and use provide an example of pluralist politics. They look at how companies use coercive power 
to force trading partners to adopt EDI. 
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Table 2. Perspectives on Organizational Politics 
Perspective Concept Goals Conflicts Application 
emphasis 
References 
Pluralist 
Political game playing (e.g., 
bargaining and coalition 
formation) in which 
stakeholders mobilize power 
(e.g., control of critical 
resources) to further their 
interests and resolve conflicts. 
Stake-
holders 
pursue their 
own different 
goals. 
Conflicts often 
manifested at the 
surface level but may 
be resolved through 
negotiation. 
Reveals 
surface-level 
conflicts and 
bases of 
power. 
Bamber & 
Lansbury (1988), 
Burkhardt & Brass 
(1990), Hart & 
Saunders (1997), 
Howell & Higgins 
(1990) 
Rationalist 
Legitimate and formal 
authorities handle 
disagreements through routine 
decision making and rational 
appraisal of arguments vis-à-
vis organizational goals and 
objectives. 
Organization-
level goals 
dominate. 
No apparent conflicts. 
Emphasizes 
formal 
authority and 
standard 
operating 
procedures. 
Brown & Magill 
(1998), Nault 
(1998), Dean, 
Yoon, & Susman, 
(1992), 
Sambamurthy & 
Zmud (1999) 
Interpretive 
Influence exerted by 
constructing meaning and 
controlling the thought patterns 
of others through social use of 
language, symbols, myths, and 
stories. 
Creation of 
perception of 
common 
goal. 
Latent conflicts may 
exist at a deeper 
structural level, but 
are not manifested 
because of perceived 
common goals. 
Focuses on 
processes 
that shape 
shared goals. 
Bloomfield & 
Danieli (1995), 
Brown (1998), 
Nidumolu et al. 
(1996) 
Radical 
Power embedded in deep 
societal structures represents 
intrinsic contradictions between 
opposing forces which 
eventually lead to radical 
change. 
Conflict of 
goals at 
societal level 
manifests in 
organization. 
Conflicts represent 
deep structures within 
society and upheaval 
ensues. 
Emphasizes 
deeper social 
structure. 
Boudreau & 
Robey (1996), 
King et al. (1994), 
Knights & 
McCabe (1999) 
From a rationalist perspective, organizations are “instruments of rational and purposeful activity” (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979, p. 202). Organizations seek to control conflicts—if not entirely eliminate them—because 
they are seen as disruptive to the harmonious nature of organizational interests. Grounded in authority 
and control, power is a neutral resource that managers employ to achieve common interests and shared 
goals. Politics plays out through data-driven arguments to support value judgments and decision making. 
Hence, the rationalist perspective adopts a surface-level view of structure by attributing power to 
hierarchical positions, organizational roles, and expertise. At an organizational level, conflicts are dealt 
with through standard operating procedures and the chain of command. With regard to outcomes, 
organizations measure goal achievement through information and control systems. Thus, the rationalist 
perspective’s strength is that it emphasizes formal authority in organizational politics. Nault (1998), who 
investigates the impact of information technology on organization designs, provides an example of 
rationalist politics. IT influences formal decision making by providing decision makers with information or 
by redesigning monitoring and incentive structures. 
From an interpretive perspective, organizations do not exist in a literal and concrete sense. Instead, they 
emerge as individuals create and recreate a shared social reality based on experiences and subjective 
interpretations (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Structures and other organizational characteristics are 
expressions of ongoing social construction, and politics focuses on communication, persuasion, and 
influencing the perceptions of others; “the parties involved exert influence by constructing the meaning of 
what others experience” (Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991, p. 382). Politics shapes interpretations of 
common goals through language and symbols rooted in organizational culture. Power is the ability to 
construct and maintain a shared social reality by ascribing meaning to the experiences of others. 
Outcomes focus on the status quo and its retention through symbolic processes. Little apparent conflict 
exists since all are presumed to be working toward a shared goal. Thus, the interpretive perspective’s 
strength is its focus on the communicative processes that shape the shared goal. It delves deeper than 
the pluralist and rationalistic perspectives since it focuses on “more subconscious processes of structuring 
reality that maintain illusions of power” (Martin, 1992, cited in Lewis & Kelemen, 2002, p. 266). An 
example of interpretive politics is Brown's (1998) study of IT implementation, which investigates how 
groups deploy narratives in attempts to preserve and further their perceived interests. 
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From a radical perspective, organizations are structural elements of society and mirror their wider social 
settings (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Structurally, organizations are concrete and relatively persistent. 
Changing the status quo is disruptive and only possible when economic and political crises occur, conflicts 
peak, and radically new social forms emerge. Politics focuses on social structure, resource control, 
radically different goals, and oppression versus emancipation in the struggle for power. The radical 
perspective draws attention to the deeper structure of politics by emphasizing societal constraints on 
individual and organizational actions as the result of decisions that those in power make (Bradshaw-
Camball & Murray, 1991). It views the “superstructure” of capitalist society as “the medium through which 
the consciousness of human beings is controlled and molded to fit the requirements of the social 
formation as a whole” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 297). The radical perspective emphasizes oppression 
by means of ideology as expressed, for example, through market forces, technologies, government 
regulations, or ideas proposed by society’s dominant class. In a class-based society, conflicts escalate 
into revolts if the dominant class fails to hold the less powerful in check through oppression. Outcomes 
focus on how macro-level politics leads to tensions that shape practices at the organizational level. Thus, 
the radical perspective’s strength is that it emphasizes the impact of deeper social structures on 
organizational politics. In their study of power, politics, and resistance to TQM, Knights and McCabe 
(1999) show that TQM both influences and is conditioned by power relations and that it is a vehicle for the 
struggle between opposing individuals and social groups. 
4 Research Methodology 
Our research grew out of a wider action research project conducted at Terma over a two-year period. The 
first author organized the project as collaborative practice research (Mathiassen, 2002), a particular form 
of action research that emphasizes close collaboration between practitioners and researchers to improve 
organizational practices. Becoming aware of the many different interests in the BPT implementation 
during our research engagement, we decided to investigate the role of politics as a means of 
understanding surprising BPT outcomes such as when two business units achieved the BPT goals despite 
misalignment of strategies and interest between themselves and the organizational change project2. 
In line with collaborative practice research, we organized the research as a case study for several 
reasons. First, case studies suit investigating “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 13), and we focused on understanding how organizational politics impacted BPT 
implementation at Terma. Second, multiple data sources and theory-driven analysis are key 
characteristics of case study research (Yin, 2003), and we had access to rich data from multiple sources 
at multiple levels. Third, the case study method is advantageous in situations where investigators ask 
“how” or “why” questions about events over which they have little or no control (Yin, 2003). Specifically, 
we organized our research as an exploratory, embedded multiple case study of BPT politics in four 
business units in the same company. Fourth, according to Walsham (1995) case studies can also be used 
to build new theory or extend existing theory (Walsham, 1995). 
Inspired by Jasperson et al. (2002) who used metatriangulation (Lewis, 1998; Lewis, 2000; Lewis & 
Grimes, 1999; Saunders, Carte, Jasperson, & Butler, 2003) to guide their review of the IS literature on 
politics and to synthesize across multiple theories, we applied a pluralist methodology (Mingers, 2001) to 
analyze the data and build theory. Hence, following Mingers, we applied multiple theoretical perspectives 
to understand and theorize BPT implementation politics and, thus, broke away from our initial or “home” 
paradigm of critical realism (Mingers, Mutch, & Willcocks, 2013; Mingers, 2004). Mingers (2001, p. 243) 
argues that “the real world is ontologically stratified and differentiated, consisting of a plurality of structures 
that generate the events that occur (and do not occur)”. Consequently, one needs to apply multiple 
perspectives that focus on different aspects of the situation. This approach afforded a better 
understanding of BPT outcomes by assisting us “in recognizing, cultivating, and accommodating diverse 
paradigmatic insights” (Jasperson et al., 2002, p. 402). In summary, with our pluralist approach, we could 
triangulate data across both theoretical perspectives and methods (Finfgeld-Connett, 2010). 
Because we had unrestricted access to quantitative and qualitative data from the corporate level and all 
four business units, we could analyze each case from multiple perspectives. Our data sources included 
audio recordings of 16 management meetings (two to three hours each) over an 18-month period during 
the BPT implementation and 21 post-implementation interviews with all key stakeholders at different 
organizational levels. The interviewees included the CEO, the corporate BPT manager, all project 
                                                     
2 We thank a reviewer for this observation. 
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managers charged with implementing new processes, the implementation manager from each business 
unit, and the business unit senior VPs. The semi-structured interviews lasted one to two hours each and 
provided comparable data across the four units to support theory building. We transcribed all audio 
recordings of meetings and interviews, which resulted in more than 500 pages of transcript. We also had 
access to more than 2,500 documents, including project status reports, minutes of meetings, BPT plans 
(for each business unit and for the overall project), and process maturity assessments (conducted under 
the auspices of the corporate BPT manager). 
To develop distinct accounts of BPT politics within each business unit at Terma, we applied multiple 
theoretical perspectives to the data set based on Bradshaw-Camball and Murray’s (1991) framework. We 
coded and analyzed the data following a five-step process. First, we developed a comprehensive case 
study protocol, including a data-analysis guide (Table 3) and a coding scheme (Table 4). The data 
analysis guide contained key questions and concepts that helped us apply the four political perspectives 
to understand how politics played out in each unit at Terma. We derived the questions from Bradshaw-
Camball and Murray’s (1991) framework, and they reflected how the perspectives apply to BPT initiatives. 
The coding scheme included codes that identified the transformation agent or process user making a 
political statement (interviewee), what unit the statement was about (organizational unit), and the political 
nature (perspective) of the statement. By using this coding scheme, we were able to select and present all 
organizational actors’ political statements that concerned either one of the four business units or corporate 
services. Further, the coding scheme helped us categorize political statements according to type and sort 
empirical data into manageable chunks (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Second, we used the coding scheme to conduct multi-perspective coding of the data, which yielded nearly 
600 expressions of organizational politics that ranged from a single sentence to half a page of transcript. 
We coded the data by 1) identifying political statements using the data-analysis guide, 2) coding 
statements based on the coding scheme, and 3) checking and recoding statements based on political 
perspective. We identified all expressions of politics and, subsequently, coded each expression in 
accordance with the coding scheme. We also attached comments to each expression to justify the coding 
and to provide preliminary interpretations of the political content and, thereby, increase intra-coder 
reliability (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We then sorted all expressions of politics according to political 
perspective, which we evaluated for internal consistency and homogeneity and recoded as needed. 
Specifically, we recoded one audio recording and compared it to the initial coding. Additionally, two 
authors independently coded the data sets for one business unit and discussed and resolved differences. 
This process brought definitional clarity to the coding scheme. This process of recoding and “check 
coding” parts of the data strengthened both intracoder (close to 90%) and intercoder (estimated at 80%) 
reliability (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Table 3. Data Analysis Guide 
Perspective Questions Concepts 
Pluralist 
How are conflicting interests between involved stakeholders 
expressed and negotiated during the initiative? 
How do differences in powerbase between stakeholders 
influence the process and its outcomes? 
Stakeholders 
Interests 
Powerbases 
Conflicts 
Negotiation 
Rationalist 
How are goals expressed and data collected and used as a 
basis for evaluating options during the initiative? 
How are choices between alternative processes and outcomes 
made based on legitimate and formal authority structures? 
Goals 
Data 
Authority 
Value judgments 
Decision making 
Interpretive 
How do actors make sense of the initiative based on past 
experience and symbolic expressions? 
How do actors use symbols to socially construct the process and 
influence its outcomes? 
Experiences 
Symbols 
Sensemaking 
Social constructions 
Organizational culture 
Radical 
How are actors influenced during the initiative by the ideologies 
and constraints of the firm’s environment? 
How does the resulting struggle between opposing forces 
influence the process and its outcomes? 
Ideology 
Constraints 
Struggle 
Oppression 
Emancipation 
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Third, we described the BPT implementation process and outcome in every business unit from each of the 
four political perspectives, which yielded sixteen distinct accounts. To facilitate these analyses, we 
selected all expressions related to a specific unit and a particular political perspective and organized them 
into sixteen tables (four perspectives on four units). Each table (exemplified in Table A1 in the Appendix) 
contained quotations from BPT participants at the corporate, unit, and project level. These tables helped 
us systematically compare statements using Yin’s (2003) pattern-matching strategy and describe the BPT 
process and outcome for each business unit and political perspective in juxtaposition with one another. 
Table 4. Coding Scheme 
Organizational Unit Interviewee Perspective 
Corporate 
Corporate management 
Corporate BPT management 
Corporate BPT agent 
Interpretive 
Pluralist 
Radical 
Rationalist 
AES3 
AES management 
AES BPT management 
AES implementation management 
ASY 
ASY management 
ASY BPT management 
ASY BPT agent 
ASY implementation management 
ISY 
ISY management 
ISY BPT management 
ISY BPT agent 
ISY implementation management 
RSY3 
RSY management 
RSY BPT management 
RSY implementation management 
Fourth, we synthesized the four distinct analyses for each unit into an overall storyline with an explanation 
of what happened and why. Table 5 shows the qualitative impacts of the political perspectives on the 
overall storylines. We describe these impacts in greater detail in Section 5. In doing so, we relate each 
story to a metaphor that encapsulates the observed organizational politics and highlights its key 
characteristics (Kendall & Kendall, 1993; Morgan, 1980, 1996). As stated by Kendall and Kendall (1993, p. 
149): “Metaphors are like the magical incantations of old. By using words that people understand and 
believe in to make linkages with the new and unfamiliar, the speaker provides the ability to envision the 
world in a new way”. The metaphors are descriptive and heuristic devices that, at an aggregate level, 
express the sequence of political moves and countermoves that played out in the business units. As such, 
the metaphors represent an understanding of organizational politics that goes beyond the underlying 
perspectives and, thereby, facilitates theorizing of BPT implementation politics. These metaphors 
encapsulate the synthesized accounts of BPT politics at Terma. Different metaphors might better describe 
other political patterns that unfold under different circumstances in other companies. 
Table 5. Impact of Political Perspectives on Synthesized Stories 
 Political 
metaphor 
Pluralist 
politics 
Rationalist 
politics 
Interpretive 
politics 
Radical 
politics 
AES Applying the hammer Minimal Major Dominant Minimal 
ASY Struggling to engage Dominant Some Some Minimal 
ISY Walking the talk Minimal Dominant Some Some 
RSY Keeping up appearances Major Minimal Dominant Minimal 
Fifth, we theorized how actors engage in political practices during BPT implementation through a creative, 
iterative process of extrapolating from empirical data, comparing results with extant theory, and engaging 
in “disciplined imagination” (Weick, 1989). This multi-step process took into account the four synthesized 
stories, the related patterns of BPT politics, and the four underlying political perspectives (Bradshaw-
                                                     
3 No BPT agent was appointed for this business unit. 
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Camball & Murray, 1991). As a first step, we listed similarities and differences among the four cases in 
order to break simplistic frames (Eisenhardt, 1989), deepen our understanding, and create possible 
explanations (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As a second step, we considered extant theory on organizational 
politics and BPT to generalize insights from each case and to integrate these into a comprehensive view 
of BPT implementation politics. During this process of creative thinking and discussion, we relied on 
Bacharach’s (1989) definition of theory and Eisenhardt’s (1989) guidelines (to deepen our understanding 
and arrive at possible explanations (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Furthermore, we followed Rivard (2014), 
Weber (2012), and Gregor (2006) in defining the type of theory we offer, specifying the boundary of our 
theory, providing definitions of concepts, and offering propositions in specifying the relationship between 
concepts. As a third step, we applied the practice of alternating “between abstractions and specific 
instances of the explanation of the phenomenon under study” (Rivard, 2014, p. viii) as a theory-building 
heuristic. We engaged in theory building with two goals in mind: 1) to contribute theory as an analytical 
framework for understanding BPT politics (i.e., analysis and description) and 2) to build theory as a 
practical tool for managing BPT politics (i.e., prescription). As a result, we developed a theoretical model 
of BPT implementation politics and derived nine propositions from it that describe how process users react 
politically to BPT implementations, how transformation agents engage with process users, and the 
interplay between the two. 
5 Findings: BPT at Terma 
In this section, we provide an overview of the corporate-led BPT project, which includes its goals, how 
Terma organized it, and key characteristics of the BPT implementation process in each of the four 
business units. Subsequently, we provide a detailed account of how organizational politics impacted 
behaviors and outcomes in each unit. In addition, we provide examples of the dynamic and emergent 
nature of organizational politics (Drory & Romm, 1990) and change during the BPT implementation 
process. The Appendix shows empirical evidence of the link between structure, processes, and outcomes. 
5.1 Overview of BPT at Terma 
Founded in 1944 as a small manufacturer of thermometers and manometers, Terma has grown to employ 
more than 1,000 people in the United States, Singapore, The Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark, 
where the company headquarters are located. Today, Terma offers a wide range of mission-critical, off-
the-shelf systems and products for civilian and military use. Even though Terma’s business units have 
considerable latitude in selecting, planning, and executing systems development projects, the company 
expects all employees to comply with the Terma Management System (TMS), a comprehensive ISO-
9001-certified quality system that contains more than 1,000 development and management processes. 
Since the company-wide ISO 9001 certification in 2003, Terma has engaged in several smaller process 
initiatives. These initiatives were either limited to a single business unit or focused on large joint-venture 
projects with business partners. However, due to a lack of management commitment, insufficient 
resources, ill-defined goals, and over-reliance on grassroots tactics, the sustained impact of these 
initiatives on Terma’s development and management practices was quite limited. When the BPT project 
began in 2005, some—if not all—of these conditions had changed. The project was conceived by a 
corporate senior VP and CTO who possessed the clout and will to push for ambitious, corporate-wide 
BPT. Given his reputation of being a “tough dog”, the senior VP had the leverage needed to initiate the 
BPT project with the CEO’s blessings. 
The BPT project ran for two years and was based on CMMI. CMMI is a model for evaluating and 
improving software- and systems-development processes (Chrissis, Konrad, & Shrum. 2003; CMMI 
Product Team, 2010). Although used globally today, the U.S. Department of Defense originally initiated 
the development of CMMI as a methodology for assessing the process maturity of defense contractors in 
developing information systems (see, e.g., https://www.sei.cmu.edu/about/statisticshistory.cfm). It is an 
incremental approach to BPT that one can use to guide improvement efforts at both project and 
organizational levels (CMMI Product Team, 2010). The model 1) distinguishes between five levels of 
process capability, 2) describes a considerable repertoire of processes in different areas (e.g., 
configuration management, measurement and analysis, process and product quality assurance, project 
monitoring and control, project planning, requirements management, and supplier agreement 
management at CMMI level 2), and 3) offers practical guidance for evaluating and improving an 
organization’s current processes. Although organizations across different industries adopt CMMI, it has 
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historically been associated with the defense industry, where the U.S. Department of Defense has actively 
promoted the model as the approach to improve and benchmark supplier capabilities. 
Terma's project is a textbook example of a BPT initiative in the sense that the processes being 
transformed through organizational innovation were information intensive and required IS support. TMS, 
for example, contains technological tools for project management. In addition, Terma used various 
information systems to support the processes in and across business units and projects. The BPT project 
at Terma had two primary goals: to bring processes into compliance with CMMI and to reach level 2 
where basic project management processes are stable and repeatable. These two BPT project goals were 
corporate-level goals. The degree of a priori alignment (Kelley, 1976; Pettigrew, 1973) of perceived 
process needs between stakeholders differed significantly across the four units (Table 6). The 
Aerostructures (AES) unit’s interests diverged from those of the BPT project in three key ways: 1) AES 
operated in segments of the aerospace industry where CMMI was not widely used for improvement and 
benchmarking, 2) most projects were blueprints with little focus on development, and 3) the unit’s 
management tradition was not strong on stability and control. The Radar Systems (RSY) unit’s interests 
also diverged from those of the BPT project: the civilian customer base had no interest in CMMI, most 
projects focused on servicing radar systems with little emphasis on development, and the unit’s 
management tradition put strong emphasis on ingenuity and creativity rather than CMMI’s focus on 
repeatability. In contrast, both the Airborne Systems (ASY) and Integrated Systems (ISY) units had vested 
interests in the BPT project because both were suppliers in the military industry that recognized CMMI as 
the model of choice for BPT and benchmarking purposes. In both ASY and ISY, most projects were IS 
development projects with a significant focus on software engineering. Also, management in these two 
units traditionally emphasized stability and control. 
From a bird’s eye view, a corporate BPT manager and a group of process experts who assisted him led 
the BPT project and orchestrated it through an extensive network of people at the corporate, business 
unit, and project levels. Initially, small teams focused on making existing TMS processes compliant with 
CMMI, which were subsequently deployed and revised in pilots before implementation. Based on the 
generic processes resulting from these corporate-level activities, each unit planned its own BPT 
implementation to ensure ownership of new processes. The projects in each unit focused on adapting the 
generic processes and putting them into practice. The corporate BPT manager continuously monitored 
each implementation project’s compliance with CMMI level 2 through assessments. Table 6 highlights 
differences and similarities across units in terms of business domain, BPT plans, extent of software 
development, alignment of process needs (goal alignment), and BPT outcomes. ASY and ISY decided to 
follow the generic plan set forth by the corporate BPT manager. AES management translated the generic 
processes into a cookbook (containing instructions, checklists, and templates) to provide implementation 
guidance for project managers. Similarly, RSY management established a lightweight version of the 
generic processes to help tailor them to needs in the unit. 
Table 6. Four Cases of BPT at Terma 
 AES ASY ISY RSY 
Business 
domain 
Aerostructures for 
commercial and military 
customers 
Aerospace 
technology for 
military customers 
Integrated systems 
for military 
customers 
Radar systems for 
civilian customers 
BPT plan 
Process tailoring through 
guidelines, checklists, and 
templates 
Generic 
implementation plan 
Generic 
implementation plan 
Management-driven 
tailoring to suit RSY 
needs 
Software 
development 
Limited Major Major Limited 
Goal 
alignment 
A priori low A priori high A priori high A priori low 
BPT outcomes 
Process maturity increased; 
not CMMI level 2 compliant; 
met BPT goals 
Process maturity 
decreased; not 
CMMI level 2 
compliant; did not 
meet BPT goals 
Process maturity 
increased; CMMI 
level 2 compliant; 
met BPT goals 
Process maturity 
decreased; CMMI 
level 2 compliant; 
did not meet BPT 
goals 
 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 185  
 
 Volume 18   Issue 3  
 
The BPT project led to varying degrees of transformation goal compliance across the four units as 
reflected in the assessments of their process maturity based on standard appraisal guidelines (CMMI 
Product Team, 2010; Rose, Aaen, & Nielsen, 2008). Corporate BPT management regularly performed 
assessments in the form of electronic surveys, which, in essence, made them technology-based 
implementation drivers. If we compare assessments at the beginning and the end of the project, the 
process maturity in AES increased and the unit stopped just short of being compliant with CMMI level 2; in 
ASY, the process maturity decreased and the unit did not reach compliance with CMMI level 2; ISY 
implemented improvements consistently throughout the project and increased its process maturity to 
become compliant with CMMI level 2; and RSY was compliant with CMMI level 2 at the beginning of the 
BPT project, but its efforts resulted in a decreased process maturity at the end of the project. 
5.2 Applying the Hammer (AES) 
AES designs and manufactures aerostructures such as roof sections, wing parts, pylons, pods, and 
engine components for both commercial and military aircraft and delivers them to systems integrators, 
known as airframers. At the time of BPT, AES was undergoing organizational restructuring and problems 
were mounting: the economy was in poor health and people were being laid off. Although AES 
management traditionally saw generic corporate processes and CMMI as inapplicable to AES, AES 
management perceived that the project was a means to solve existing problems by reducing risks and 
increasing project predictability. Hence, social construction played a dominant role (Table 5) in AES in 
forming a shared vision of the BPT project as both a welcome solution to existing problems and a symbol 
of the unit’s future directions. Having encouraged the formation of a shared vision, the AES senior VP 
pursued BPT with an emphasis on rationalist politics to improve the unit’s process maturity by relying on a 
cookbook approach and by adapting Terma’s generic processes to the local context. Following the adage 
“when you have a hammer, the world looks like a nail”, BPT was an opportunistic and welcome solution to 
existing problems. Even though their process needs did not perfectly align with the BPT changes, AES 
managers realized value in successfully maneuvering the BPT implementation to their benefit. They were 
in a proverbial sense “applying the hammer” to drive changes within the business unit, which left a strong 
impact on AES projects. Because the unit acknowledged that its goals were overlapping with those of the 
BPT project, and due to the absence of manifest conflicts, it did not emphasize pluralist or radical politics. 
The AES senior VP became a symbol of decisive action. He attempted to discursively construct the BPT 
project as an answer to current challenges and poor project practices in the past. The project was an 
expression of interpretive politics based on skillful use of language and symbols. Indeed, his management 
style became known as “the John way”. According to the AES implementation manager, “the AES senior 
VP is a very systematic person, very methodical”. AES participants accepted and understood the reasons 
behind his decisions and followed his lead. During BPT, the AES senior VP also used symbols to facilitate 
the process and influence outcomes. For example, he created an image of success by likening AES to 
ISY—the unit that was, in his eyes, the unofficial process champions at Terma—by frequently comparing 
maturity assessment results and showing the two units to be on par. Both the AES implementation 
manager and the project managers bought into the AES senior VP’s vision and approach and praised the 
cookbook’s usefulness despite implementation problems. They saw value in implementing BPT because it 
promoted AES interests. In the words of the AES implementation manager, “the kind of project 
management I’ve seen out here has been diddly-squat…, so, right away, I accepted that this is the tool”. 
Having secured commitment to the BPT project, the implementation proceeded in a rational manner. 
Based on legitimate and formal authority, AES made decisions between alternative implementation 
choices as the unit developed the process cookbook to facilitate BPT. AES managers based these 
decisions on value judgments of the applicability of new processes and their knowledge of project 
managers’ current strengths and weaknesses. In the corporate BPT manager’s words, “AES is taking a 
different approach. Generally speaking, they run things pretty tough and rigidly. They want to establish 
checklists and that sort of thing in realization that it is the only way to push things through.”. The cookbook 
development and implementation were management driven and executed faithfully by the involved project 
managers—even when delays occurred because of problems with adapting processes to the local culture. 
AES initially applied and continuously adapted the cookbook approach throughout the BPT 
implementation as a response and pro-active means of problem solving to wavering goal compliance. The 
AES senior VP and AES implementation manager conceived and executed this response. According to 
AES project manager #2, “it’s like our management says that we have to implement the BPT project, and 
it has to be part of every program”. Consequently, the BPT project strongly impacted both participating 
and future AES projects. The AES senior VP stated: 
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We see a positive trend in the projects that have been subjected to [the new processes] in terms 
of requirements management, customer relations, managing and monitoring projects. They 
have also led to very positive discussions about baselines when starting new projects. 
5.3 Struggling to Engage (ASY) 
ASY is a global provider of advanced aerospace technology for fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, and 
helicopters with a focus on integrating defensive aids and systems to sustain pilots’ comprehensive 
battlefield overview. During BPT, ASY encountered new business opportunities that required attention. 
Resources were already being stretched to the point where employees were complaining about stress and a 
poor working environment. To address this situation, the ASY senior VP had to prioritize and negotiate 
conflicting interests. Although the ASY senior VP voiced support for CMMI’s ideology (in the sense of a set 
of ideas about management accepted as best practice in the industry) and underlying management 
philosophy of increasing efficiency, predictability, and repeatability by improving process quality, he 
questioned the necessity of a CMMI appraisal. Instead, he focused on maintaining customers’ perception of 
ASY as a credible and trustworthy market player as evidenced by their long-standing customer relationships. 
The real struggle played out at the project level, where project managers saw CMMI as adding 
administrative burdens and detracting attention and resources away from more valued practices. The 
combination of new business opportunities, the ASY senior VP’s ambivalence toward the BPT project, and 
the project managers’ struggle against the CMMI ideology resulted in futile efforts to resolve conflicts and 
strike a responsive chord with multiple stakeholders. In this way, pluralist politics dominated BPT in ASY 
(Table 5), although the underlying conflict of interests was neither escalated nor resolved. As a result, ASY 
was unsuccessfully “struggling to engage” during the entire project. During this struggle, the unit displayed a 
few signs of rationalist and interpretive politics, whereas it placed minimal emphasis on radical politics. 
Overall, ASY showed little commitment to the BPT project and consequently achieved only modest positive 
results from it. There was a conflict of interest between the BPT project’s goals and process focus with 
ASY’s strategic interests and customer focus. Conflicting interests were expressed on several occasions and 
resulted in lack of management commitment to and employee participation in the project. Despite 
frustrations, the ASY implementation manager accepted this lack of support and involvement, and ASY 
project managers were content to conduct business as usual. The ASY implementation manager conceded: 
If you have a customer who is paying for something, it is a different matter. It is easier to 
postpone [an internal BPT project] even though it is equally important in the long run. It is easier 
to ask for absolution. There is no immediate cost of postponing these processes. 
In the end, it was differences in powerbases among the stakeholders that influenced the BPT’s results. 
The corporate BPT manager and his local allies—one ASY project manager and the ASY implementation 
manager—could not change the degree of ASY’s BPT engagement and the ASY senior VP’s priorities. As 
such, the corporate BPT manager had no choice but to accept the ASY senior’s VP’s decision to scale 
down his unit’s BPT implementation. In the face of competing forces, the corporate BPT manager and his 
local allies could not build a coalition based on converging BPT goals and provide the necessary 
resources during the BPT implementation as a response to competing interests and lack of goal 
compliance. Later, the ASY senior VP justified his prioritizing customer projects as follows: 
When I look back, I think it was the right thing to do because we would have received a much 
more negative response from the organization if we had tried to implement broadly at a time 
when people were extremely busy. 
Although the ASY senior VP bought into CMMI’s ideology and supported its underlying management 
philosophy, he did not give in to the dominating process discourse in the defense industry and continued 
to question the business value of CMMI assessments. Both he and the ASY implementation manager 
regarded CMMI as nice but unnecessary. The ASY senior VP argued:  
CMMI is non-essential. We’d like to have it, but if you ask if I could argue that we’ve lost an 
order because of it, I cannot…. It can’t be used for much else than to indicate that you’re a 
player within the industry. 
At the project level, a struggle was evident as most project managers openly criticized CMMI and the new 
processes. ASY project manager #1 said, “you can disregard everything—disregard the whole TMS and not 
do anything about the things you’re supposed to be doing. People ignore everything. They simply don’t give 
a damn.”. However, the conflict between corporate management’s desire for increased control and local 
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project managers’ dislike for increased administrative burdens never manifested itself and was therefore 
never negotiated. Instead, the BPT project in ASY displayed some evidence of a combination of rationalist 
politics (by developing plans, performing assessments, and participating in meetings) and interpretive politics 
(as evidenced by key actors expressing good intentions and not escalating conflicts). Because the corporate 
BPT manager also had reservations about the applicability of company-wide processes, the decision to give 
low priority to BPT was met with little opposition outside ASY despite the CEO’s view of CMMI as a 
necessary tool for increasing efficiency and documenting organizational maturity. 
5.4 Walking the Talk (ISY) 
ISY provides integrated solutions for managing air, ground, and naval operations through large-scale 
projects for military customers. Coinciding with the BPT project, ISY faced market demands for proof-of-
process maturity. CMMI was, therefore, highly valued as both a means and an end. ISY accepted the 
defense industry’s maturity discourse and embraced the CMMI ideology wholeheartedly without any signs 
of struggle. ISY demonstrated support both in words and in action. Based on a priori goal alignment, ISY’s 
degree of participation in BPT was high and its timetable was ambitious. Having analyzed gaps between 
existing practices and CMMI’s requirements and using all available information about implementation 
progress, ISY process champions effectively established new, mandatory project practices. Confronted 
with questions about how to implement processes into projects, the implementation champions (the ISY 
implementation manager and the ISY training manager) intervened and supported each project manager 
individually. By adopting the CMMI ideology and rationally executing BPT, ISY was “walking the talk”. The 
unit followed Terma’s chain of command in implementing new processes, which left a strong impact on 
ISY projects. Hence, BPT in ISY was dominated by rationalist politics supplemented by some radical (the 
influence of the maturity discourse) and interpretive politics (creating a belief in CMMI as basis for the 
unit’s operation) (Table 5). The unit only minimally emphasized pluralist politics since it had little need to 
resolve conflicts of interest. 
Indeed, ISY’s BPT implementation was greatly influenced by the CMMI ideology and market constraints in 
the defense industry. In particular, the CEO, ISY senior VP, and corporate BPT manager pointed to 
contract negotiations in which ISY’s lack of a CMMI appraisal had been a problem. According to the CEO, 
“we simply cannot deliver to certain customer segments if we’re not at CMMI level 3. So we must have it. 
This is the case for ISY in particular.”. The ISY senior VP added: 
It is crucial for us to be at CMMI level 2 and be able to say that we are in control of what we 
develop…. It is not enough to have a certificate, because I can only live off that for a short while. 
It’s burning the furniture to heat the house—it doesn’t work in the long run. It’s about the 
economic benefit. 
Accordingly, ISY management adopted the CMMI ideology as a means to increase process predictability 
and efficiency. In the words of the ISY implementation manager, “it’s important for us to be efficient, and it’s 
important for us to be able to manage a business that’s predictable”. Moreover, ISY’s project managers did 
not seriously challenge the CMMI ideology. Only scattered attempts at struggle surfaced during 
implementation, and the ISY implementation and training managers immediately addressed the issues that 
emerged through intervention and effective communication. Thus, during the BPT implementation, the ISY 
implementation and training managers were constantly scanning their environment and reinforcing the 
shared BPT goal as a response to criticism and implementation difficulties. 
Because ISY was committed to the BPT’s goals and the new processes, the project was planned and 
monitored similar to other projects within the business unit, and corrective actions were taken based on 
available maturity assessment data. For example, after evaluating implementation progress and 
problems—including lack of training and information about new processes—the ISY implementation and 
training managers modified BPT project plans. As ISY project manager #4 said, “it was the ISY training 
manager and the ISY implementation manager who had already planned such an implementation 
sequence to keep us on track”. They spotted a need for guidance, identified gaps between existing 
practices and new processes, and, to ensure CMMI compliance, leveraged their formal authority to 
establish solutions across all projects. 
5.5 Keeping up Appearances (RSY) 
RSY provides radar systems for surveillance applications, including antennas and transceivers, to a 
mostly civilian market. In RSY, competing social constructions of the BPT project existed side by side: the 
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RSY senior VP emphasized that the new processes might change project practices for the better, while 
the RSY implementation manager criticized the standardization ideal and the BPT project organization. 
These tensions resulted in discrepancies between, on the one hand, RSY’s self-representation as 
supporters of the BPT project and, on the other hand, maturity assessments that documented a weak 
implementation impact on RSY projects. Although the CEO and the corporate BPT manager questioned 
RSY’s engagement, RSY’s BPT efforts were dominated by interpretive politics (Table 5) as they continued 
to “keep up appearances” by signaling commitment without making a whole-hearted attempt to reach BPT 
goals. As an expression of pluralist politics, the situation in RSY was characterized by conflicting goals 
and interests. However, rather than seeking confrontation and negotiation with the corporate-wide BPT 
project, RSY maintained a socially constructed image of being fully committed but only implemented 
minimal BPT processes in a couple of projects. The mixed messages and passive resistance (Marakas & 
Hornik, 1996) rendered it impossible to develop a shared understanding between RSY and the corporate 
level. This lack of a shared understanding at a deeper level below the appearance of commitment led to a 
failure to negotiate, prioritize, and resolve conflicts. Accordingly, the unit only minimally emphasized 
rationalist and radical politics. 
The RSY senior VP made no secret of the fact that the BPT project had little value and conflicted with 
RSY interests. The project’s focus on repeatable project management processes was ill-aligned with 
RSY’s emphasis on customer relationships, and its focus on process standardization was at odds with the 
VP’s preference for tailoring processes to each unit’s needs. In his own words: 
All the time, the [business units] have to sort out the kind of structure that results from 
standardized documents and processes and decide whether they can be used as is or whether 
they have to be adjusted. Do it the other way around. Let the units optimize each process area 
themselves. 
Moreover, the BPT project’s focus on process compliance contrasted starkly with RSY’s history of 
rewarding project managers for meeting deadlines and satisfying customer demands. The RSY 
implementation manager said: 
On an everyday basis, people accomplish certain things that bring home the bacon and earn 
them the thumbs up from the people they work for. This is a high priority for everyone…. It’s not 
a priority for a project manager to implement these new processes if he also has a project to 
complete. 
The tensions manifested at the project level where project managers were asked to implement only 
processes that they considered useful and valuable. The RSY implementation manager shielded RSY 
projects from the administrative burden associated with new processes, but project managers were left to 
fend for themselves and received limited guidance and information. The RSY implementation manager 
elaborated: “Part of our tailoring has ensured that the required activities are reasonable given the size of 
each project. I have, therefore, cut down on project reporting to fit the size of the projects.”. The corporate 
BPT manager attempted to retain control of BPT implementation in RSY by monitoring progress, 
communicating non-compliance, and offering support. However, differences in powerbases between him 
and RSY stakeholders rendered the strategy ineffective. According to the corporate BPT manager: 
RSY claims they will reach the goal in time. However, I have heard nothing else from them. 
Yesterday, I saw something the RSY implementation manager has written about their 
interpretation [of processes]. So, apparently something is happening. But the participating 
projects have not come very far. Some have, others have not. It is really difficult to ascertain. 
The competing social constructions of the BPT project made monitoring the unit’s progress difficult. On 
the one hand, the RSY senior VP emphasized the BPT project’s positive impact on existing practices—a 
social construction that RSY project manager #1 contributed to by describing his implementation 
experiences as positive. On the other hand, the RSY implementation manager criticized not only the 
emphasis on standardization but also the implementation effort’s organization. In particular, he disputed 
the reliability and value of maturity assessments and used various symbols (such as “rolling snowball”) to 
portray the BPT project as a juggernaut and ill aligned with RSY's organizational culture. In his own words: 
With such a process apparatus, you start out by making a snowball and get it rolling, and then 
you expect it to yield a positive result somewhere down the line. The problem is that you’ll never 
be able to measure it because it will be three years before it is implemented. 
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Based on past experiences, the RSY project managers responded to these expressions of pluralist politics 
by trying to reconcile the apparent ambiguity toward the BPT project. They implemented processes only 
hesitantly. RSY project manager #1 described the ambiguity as follows: “things have changed—from 
being something that management said we had to do, to being something management says we’re not 
going to do. Such mixed signals are very confusing.”. For his part, the corporate BPT manager accepted 
the status quo but expected that maturity assessments would eventually challenge RSY’s alleged process 
maturity. During the BPT implementation, the corporate BPT manager did not escalate the conflict and 
exercise his power and corporate mandate as a response to deal with the lack of goal compliance despite 
the espoused support for the overarching BPT goal. Instead, he relied on the assessments to identify 
constraints and lack of implementation progress. 
In all four cases, corporate and business unit managers leveraged their powerbases based on their 
hierarchical position and control of resources. Though the corporate managers had higher positions in the 
organizational hierarchy and used their power based on authority and control of corporate resources, the 
business unit managers had additional leverage from catering to customer interests. The implementation 
managers relied on power vested in their roles and based on their expertise. The project managers had a 
lower position than others in the organizational hierarchy and relatively fewer powerbases. Hence, they 
tried their best to comply with the demands of other powerful stakeholders. 
6 Theorizing BPT Implementation Politics 
Relying on a pluralist methodology (Mingers, 2001), we leveraged our empirical analyses and the extant 
literature to theorize BPT implementation politics (Eisenhardt, 1989). As such, we moved from empirical 
description and existing theory toward new theory of how stakeholders engage in politics during BPT 
implementation (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). Consistent with our engagement at Terma, we sought to offer 
concepts and relationships to analyze (Gregor, 2006) how stakeholders engage in politics during BPT 
implementations through different process user responses and transformation agent counter responses and 
to prescribe (Gregor, 2006) how reinforcement, accommodation, persuasion, and confrontation politics may 
be combined to proactively influence BPT behaviors and outcomes. Table 7 defines our key concepts. 
Table 7. Key Theoretical Concepts 
Construct Definition 
Process user Change recipient as party most directly affected by a change initiative. 
Transformation agent Change agent as party responsible for initiating or driving a change initiative. 
Process user response 
Political reaction of process users to change initiative, including rationalist, pluralist, 
interpretive, and radical politics. 
Transformation agent 
counter response 
Political reaction of transformation agents to political actions taken by process users, 
including reinforcement, accommodation, persuasion, and confrontation politics. 
Goal compliance 
Degree to which process user responses converge toward the goals promoted by 
transformation agents on behalf of management. 
Goal alignment 
Degree to which the goals promoted by transformation agents on behalf of management 
offer solutions to the perceived problems of process users. 
Powerbase 
Source of power that enables one party to compel another party to do something, 
including hierarchical position, control of critical resources, expertise, and knowledge. 
Deep structure politics 
Political activity which is deeply embedded in organizational or societal structures, 
including institutional logics, discourses, and ideological beliefs. 
Success State at which process goals of the initiative are achieved. 
6.1 Basic Premises 
BPT are technology-enabled management-led initiatives that target organizational goals (Davenport, 1993; 
Grover & Markus, 2008; Venkatraman, 1994) by transcending both vertical boundaries from management to 
operations and horizontal boundaries between different organizational units (Boudreau & Robey, 1996; 
Franz & Robey, 1984; Knights & McCabe, 1999, 1994; McCabe, 2000). As such, they change the 
organization of work and, thus, often conflict with key stakeholders’ interests (Boudreau & Robey, 1996; 
Buchanan, 1997; Grover et al., 1988). Keen’s (1981) response-counter response view of BPT 
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implementation and the general idea that organizational change initiatives result from ongoing interactions 
between change recipients and change agents capture the resulting interactions between stakeholder 
groups (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Bartunek, Rousseau, Rudolph, & DePalma, 2006; Stensaker, 
Falkenberg, & Grønhaug, 2008). Thus, we assume BPT implementation politics plays out as follows: 
Premise 1: Politics in BPT implementation initiatives unfold as ongoing interactions between 
process user (change recipient) responses and transformation agent (change agent) 
counter responses. 
Further, from analyzing Terma, we found that each unit developed its own, unique response to the 
corporate initiative. ISY, for example, fully embraced the BPT initiative and collaborated closely with the 
corporate BPT team by drawing on shared resources and maturity assessments to support progress. In 
contrast, RSY held the corporate BPT team at arm’s length by keeping interactions to a minimum and 
continuously communicating their commitment to avoid confrontations over a lack of progress. These 
variations suggest BPT implementation politics depends on the alignment between the initiative’s process 
goals and users’ process needs (i.e., the extent to which BPT implementation initiatives offer solutions to 
perceived problems). This observation is consistent with the recommendation in the literature to compare 
process goals with existing practices’ perceived strengths and weaknesses at the very start of BPT 
initiatives (Chrissis et al., 2003; CMMI Product Team, 2010). When the goal alignment is high, less conflict 
and more collaboration is expected than if the process goals do not meet process users’ perceived needs 
(Boudreau & Robey, 1996; Buchanan, 1997; Currie & Willcocks, 1996). While this logic is true in principle, 
the variations across units at Terma suggest that user responses may differ from this pattern. Although 
ISY’s and ASY’s perceived needs aligned well with process goals while AES’s and RSY’s perceived 
needs did not, ISY’s and AES’s responses were less conflictual and led to greater goal compliance 
compared to ASY’s and RSY’s responses. Hence, goal alignment is an indicator of the likely political 
response to BPT implementation, whereas goal compliance is an indicator of the actual response. 
Consistent with this observation, the BPT literature suggests one should continually monitor goal 
compliance through regular process assessments (Chrissis et al., 2003; CMMI Product Team, 2010), 
which leads to our second premise for theorizing BPT implementation politics: 
Premise 2: How BPT implementation politics unfolds depends on goal alignment and goal 
compliance. 
6.2 Process User Responses 
As Table 8 illustrates, one should understand ISY’s walking-the-talk response in the context of the industry’s 
preference for CMMI. Terma’s CMMI-based process goals were consistent with perceived process needs in 
ISY as evidenced by the unit’s high level of CMMI level 2 goal compliance. Essentially, the maturity 
discourse motivated and influenced ISY’s BPT implementation and served as a shared reference point for 
process users and transformation agents. In AES, there was low a priori alignment with the CMMI-based 
process goals, but the senior VP and his allies changed this situation by constructing an image of BPT as a 
welcome solution to existing problems, which led to the applying-the-hammer response and, eventually, to 
high goal compliance. In ASY, the senior VP’s support for BPT implementation was synonymous with high a 
priori goal alignment. However, the unit’s struggling-to-engage response resulted from its prioritizing 
emerging business opportunities over the BPT project, which adversely affected goal compliance. Finally, 
RSY’s keeping-up-appearances response effectively concealed the unit’s low goal alignment by continually 
signaling its commitment to the BPT implementation despite giving priority to product development and 
customer service. Not surprisingly, this focus led to decreasing goal compliance during the implementation. 
 
Table 8. Exemplar Process User Responses 
 High goal alignment  
High goal 
compliance 
Business unit: ISY 
Politics: Walking the talk 
Business unit: ASY 
Politics: Struggling to engage Low goal 
compliance Business unit: AES 
Politics: Applying the hammer 
Business unit: RSY 
Politics: Keeping up appearances 
 Low goal alignment  
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Although political analyses tend to rely on a one-dimensional understanding of power rooted in resources as 
expressed in pluralist politics, Hardy (1996) argues that there are other equally important sources of politics 
(Hart & Saunders, 1997; Pettigrew, 1975; Schein, 1985). Power rooted in organizational structures and 
processes may manifest as rationalist politics (Ngwenyama & Nielsen, 2003), power grounded in deeply 
rooted cultural values may be expressed through interpretive politics and the ongoing creation of meaning 
among stakeholders (Brown, 1995, 1998), and power deeply embedded in the structure of society may lead 
to organizational repression or emancipation (McCabe, 2000) through radical politics. One may combine 
these perspectives on organizational politics to make sense of BPT implementations. For example, 
Nidumolu et al. (1996) observed that a functional perspective was more useful in understanding IS 
evaluation, whereas a symbolic perspective better helped explain IS implementation; Franz and Robey 
(1984) found rational and pluralist politics to be mutually reinforcing in successfully carrying out 
implementation efforts and in avoiding blame in unsuccessful BPT initiatives; and Sillince and Mouakket 
(1997) used different political perspectives to analyze the development and implementation of a housing 
information system. Consistent with these findings, the four units’ responses to Terma’s corporate BPT 
project reflect combinations of rationalist, pluralist, interpretive, and radical politics (Bradshaw-Camball & 
Murray, 1991) that represent different paths toward BPT outcomes. Uncovering the patterns through which a 
group of process users respond to BPT initiatives may, thus, provide transformation agents with important 
indicators of whether the group is moving toward higher goal compliance. Overall, these insights suggest: 
Proposition 1: BPT initiatives will more likely succeed if transformation agents monitor how 
different groups of process users respond to BPT implementation through patterns 
of rationalist, pluralist, interpretive, and radical politics. 
Looking more closely at the particular patterns of political responses to Terma’s BPT initiative (Table 5), it 
is interesting to consider the responses from the two business units that eventually achieved high goal 
compliance. ISY responded mainly through rationalist politics that relied on structures created by 
interpretive and radical politics, and AES responded through rationalist politics enabled by dominant 
interpretive politics. Deep structure politics influenced both cases. In contrast to activities at the surface 
structure of politics, which were guided by consciously recognized interests, other actions were influenced 
by meanings and interpretations, which were embedded at a deeper structural level. In one of the cases, 
mutual understanding was fostered through symbolism and social construction, and, in another case, daily 
operations were governed by institutionalized ideological beliefs. In ISY, these influences manifested 
through radical politics grounded in industry-wide process maturity ideologies combined with interpretive 
politics to disseminate these ideologies within the unit. For example, CMMI is institutionalized at the 
industry level as a way to complete projects more effectively. In AES, the deep structure influences 
manifested through the senior VP’s effective use of interpretive politics to construct an image of BPT as a 
welcome solution to the unit’s existing problems. In both cases, these influences paved the way for 
moving the BPT agenda forward inside the unit through rationalist politics. These findings suggest: 
Proposition 2: BPT initiatives will more likely succeed when process users pave the way for 
rationalist politics through deep structure influences based on interpretive or radical 
politics. 
In contrast, none of the two units that eventually achieved low goal compliance seriously engaged in 
rationalist politics, which presupposes a common purpose or goal. Instead, ASY responded by engaging 
in pluralist politics with some rationalist and interpretive politics, and RSY’s response reflected a 
combination of interpretive and pluralist politics (Table 5). In both these cases, pluralist politics was 
prevalent (dominant or major) albeit for quite different reasons. ASY had high goal alignment, but the unit 
struggled to engage seriously because of competing commitments, whereas RSY had low goal alignment, 
but the unit concealed its interests by appearing to be seriously engaged in the BPT initiative (Table 8). 
These patterns of process user responses suggest: 
Proposition 3: BPT initiatives will more likely fail when process users give priority to competing 
interests despite high goal alignment. 
Proposition 4: BPT initiatives will more likely fail when process users conceal low goal alignment 
through interpretive politics. 
6.3 Transformation Agent Counter Responses 
The literature emphasizes the importance of transformation agents’ active political involvement. Buchanan 
(1997) stresses effective BPT management requires both technical and political skills. Keen (1981) and 
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McCabe et al. (1998) argue that politics is fundamental to BPT; it motivates behavior and can have 
beneficial organizational outcomes. Although the focus has traditionally been on political conflict, Hardy 
(1996) points out it is equally important for transformation agents to engage in politics to prevent conflicts 
from arising, build relationships, and create shared meanings. Accordingly, Willcocks and Smith (1995) 
suggest transformation agents monitor politics during BPT, carry out power audits regularly, and 
continuously sustain political momentum. Thus, consistent with extant research we propose 
transformation agents should respond actively to process user politics through different types of counter 
responses (Table 9). Proposition 5 addresses counter responses in general while the remaining 
propositions focus on exemplar combinations. 
Proposition 5: BPT initiatives will more likely succeed if transformation agents respond actively to 
process user politics through combinations of confrontation, accommodation, 
persuasion, and reinforcement politics. 
Table 9. Transformation Agent Counter Responses  
 High goal alignment  
High goal 
compliance 
Reinforcement politics 
Threat: Weakening powerbases 
Opportunity: Reinforce overarching 
BPT goal that is broadly shared; 
environmental scanning 
Persuasion politics 
Threat: Competing forces 
Opportunity: Build coalitions based 
on converging BPT goals; provide 
resources Low goal 
compliance Accommodation politics 
Threat: Emerging conflicts 
Opportunity: Sustain coalition by 
promoting common aspects of BPT 
goals; pro-active problem solving 
Confrontation politics 
Threat: Escalation of conflicts 
Opportunity: Construct motivational 
accounts; exercise power to push 
BPT goals and identify constraints 
 Low goal alignment  
In case of low goal alignment and indications of decreasing goal compliance, transformation agents may 
engage process users through confrontation politics (Table 8). RSY illustrated these conditions in that 
process users continually signaled their commitment to BPT while giving priority to product development 
and customer service. Although the corporate BPT manager questioned RSY’s progress and attempted to 
retain control of the unit’s BPT implementation by monitoring progress, communicating non-compliance, 
and offering support, RSY successfully exploited differences in powerbases to conceal its interests. In 
such situations, where process users hide diverging interests and avoid conflict (Brown, 1995), little 
progress toward goal compliance and unsatisfactory results will likely characterize BPT (Knights & 
McCabe, 1998; Willcocks & Smith, 1995). As a first step, transformation agents may use project audits 
and maturity assessments to identify and highlight discrepancies between process users’ espoused 
commitment and the actual outcomes of their engagement. Next, they may confront process users with 
the results and activate a strong powerbase to negotiate an acceptable BPT involvement. Transformation 
agents may also exert influence through “repressive relations of power” (Boudreau & Robey, 1996; 
McCabe, 2000), especially when transformation agents have a relatively strong source of power 
compared to that of the process user. Such escalation may lead to all out warfare between transformation 
agents and process users. Either way, confrontation politics can escalate conflicts and eventually lead 
transformation agents to forfeit the political game and terminate the project. 
Proposition 6: When goal alignment is low and there is decreasing goal compliance, BPT 
initiatives will more likely succeed if transformation agents can leverage a strong 
powerbase to engage process users in confrontation politics. 
When there are indications of increasing goal compliance despite low goal alignment, transformation agents 
may engage in accommodation politics (Table 9) to downplay differences between stakeholders and instead 
focus on shared goals and advantages of cooperation. AES illustrated this situation in that corporate 
transformation agents supported the senior VP and his allies in tailoring processes to local conditions and 
needs. Such accommodation was possible because the process users had accepted the image of the BPT 
initiative as a welcome solution to their problems, which allowed the implementation to proceed through 
rational means. To avoid conflicts in these situations with low goal alignment, transformation agents should 
continuously nurture an image of BPT as contributing to problem solving and pay attention to competing 
social constructions that support conflicting images. Hence, transformation agents must be watchful of 
speech acts that use language and symbols to discursively construct BPT in both favorable and unfavorable 
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ways (Brown, 1995; Brown, 1998). To build and maintain powerful coalitions (Kelley, 1976) with process 
users, transformation agents can themselves use political narratives to communicate how BPT contributes to 
solving process users’ perceived problems. In addition, they may proactively monitor emerging issues, 
continuously adapt solutions to address perceived problems, and redistribute resources in favor of process 
user interests. Such pragmatic problem solving requires the process users’ active involvement (Grover et al., 
1988) to secure BPT commitment and counteract shirking that risks degenerating into subversive behavior 
as displayed by RSY’s keeping-up-appearances response. Similarly, if transformation agents eventually fail 
to sustain the coalition that holds the BPT initiative together, their engagement with process users may shift 
toward confrontation politics. These considerations motivate: 
Proposition 7: When goal compliance is increasing despite low goal alignment, BPT initiatives will 
more likely succeed if transformation agents engage process users in 
accommodation politics. 
Turning to situations characterized by decreasing goal compliance despite high goal alignment, 
transformation agents may focus on persuasion politics (Table 9). ASY illustrated these conditions in that 
process users, despite alignment with BPT goals, struggled to engage because customer demands took 
precedence. Although corporate transformation agents tried to persuade ASY to commit to the BPT 
implementation, differences in powerbases forced them to accept the ASY senior VP’s continued 
prioritization of customer needs over BPT. As long as competing interests remain latent as in ASY, this 
struggling-to-engage pattern is likely to dominate with wavering commitment and dwindling resources 
(Knights & McCabe, 1998; Willcocks & Smith, 1995). When handling competing interests, transformation 
agents must pay attention to discrepancies between intentions and actions during BPT and carefully 
consider whether conflicting demands challenge process users’ ability to honor BPT commitments 
(Willcocks & Smith, 1995). Once competing interests become manifest, transformation agents may 
negotiate conflicting demands and build coalitions (Keen, 1981; Kelley, 1976), which involves explicitly 
negotiating resources and business priorities with process users and may require reassigning people from 
other projects or units, or prioritizing BPT involvement at the expense of potential business opportunities. 
It is important to show how local goals might negatively affect BPT goals and, if possible, to consolidate 
shared meanings among process users at a deeper structure level. If such persuasion politics is 
unsuccessful due to failure to accommodate process user interests, insufficient resources, or a weakening 
powerbase, transformation agents may change the scope and timetable of the BPT initiative to realistically 
reflect circumstances. At the extreme, they may forfeit the political game and terminate the project. 
Proposition 8: When goal compliance is decreasing despite high goal alignment, BPT initiatives 
will more likely succeed if transformation agents engage process users in 
persuasion politics. 
Finally, transformation agents may engage in reinforcement politics when goal alignment is high and there 
are indications of increasing goal compliance (Table 9). ISY illustrated these conditions in that 
transformation agents stimulated and supported BPT implementation through regular maturity 
assessments, by providing guidance to project managers, and via ad hoc problem solving. While 
transformation agents may reinforce BPT implementation by cooperating with process users in solving 
complex and emerging BPT problems, process users’ weakening powerbases threaten reinforcement 
politics. Given sufficient resources and consensus, transformation agents may proactively support BPT 
implementation by promoting organizational benefits and by engaging in environmental scanning to detect 
such weakening powerbases. If resources dwindle and disagreements arise, they may sustain progress 
by negotiating additional resources or by influencing perceptions through pluralist and interpretive politics. 
Proposition 9: When goal alignment is high and there are indications of increasing goal 
compliance, BPT will more likely succeed if transformation agents engage 
process users in reinforcement politics. 
6.4 A Summary Model 
Figure 2 summarizes our theorizing. Politics is an intrinsic part of dynamic BPT implementations that depends 
on and impacts goal alignment and goal compliance throughout the process (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011).  
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Figure 2. Model of BPT Implementation Politics 
It unfolds over time through interactions between process user responses and transformation agent 
counter responses. As transformation agents initiate BPT in pursuit of organizational innovations, process 
users may respond using combinations of political perspectives in support or opposition of BPT goals. 
Transformation agents may engage in counter responses that support or challenge process user 
responses, which, in turn, triggers new responses and counter responses. Although our theorizing 
supports the management of BPT implementation, it also serves the general purpose of raising 
awareness and helping stakeholders “learn how to use power to protect their interests. Pretending that 
power does not exist does not make it go away” (emphasis in original) (Hardy, 1996, p. 14). Indeed, 
Krackhardt (1990) argues that understanding an organization’s informal political network is itself a 
significant powerbase above and beyond power associated with the hierarchical positions of stakeholders. 
As a result, our theorizing affords stakeholders important “indirect power derived from knowing and using 
the power others have to influence the target” (Krackhardt, 1990, p. 359). 
7 Discussion 
Although extant theory acknowledges the political nature of BPT initiatives, research has not adequately 
leveraged theory on power and politics to empirically investigate BPT. Moreover, the literature offers no 
theories dedicated to helping managers understand and manage BPT implementation politics. Motivated 
by these considerations, we applied existing theory on organizational politics to conduct detailed analyses 
of BPT in four business units at Terma. Asking how knowledge of organizational politics can help one 
understand and manage business process transformation behaviors and outcomes, we sought to provide 
insights into BPT at Terma and to synthesize our findings to advance theory on BPT implementation 
politics. Inspired by Jasperson et al. (2002), we applied Bradshaw-Camball and Murray’s (1991) 
rationalist, pluralist, interpretive, and radical perspectives on organizational politics to arrive at multi-
perspective explanations of how politics had shaped BPT in each of Terma’s four business units. We 
subsequently went beyond the four political perspectives to theorize how process users and 
transformation agents make sense of and engage in politics during BPT implementation (Figure 2). By 
doing so, our theorizing answers the call to integrate differing perspectives on organizational politics in 
“understanding and diagnosing organizational events” (Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991, p. 396). It also 
highlights that some perspectives are more dominant in some organizational contexts than others. For 
example, in Bradshaw-Camball and Murray’s (1991) suburban hospital setting, the rationalist perspective 
was not emphasized to any extent. In contrast, in our BPT setting which focused on implementing 
processes for project planning, monitoring, and control in systems development, rationalist politics was 
highly prevalent in two units (AES and ISY). 
Following a pluralist research methodology, we first leveraged the political perspectives to identify four 
distinct patterns of BPT politics among process users across Terma’s business units, which we 
metaphorically describe as: applying the hammer, struggling to engage, walking the talk, and keeping up 
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appearances. We arrived at these patterns by developing distinct accounts of BPT implementation in every 
business unit from each of the four political perspectives and subsequently synthesizing these into overall 
storylines of how politics had shaped BPT in each unit. Table 5 summarizes how the four perspectives 
contributed to the synthesized account of BPT politics in each unit. The patterns encapsulated in the 
metaphors highlight key aspect of the situation and display variations in their emphasis on the four political 
perspectives. For example, the walking-the-talk pattern may also be rooted in (dominant or major impact in 
Table 5) either interpretive or radical politics, which both operate on a deeper structure level. However, given 
different perspectives on the goal of BPT, it is unlikely that rationalist politics will become dominant in cases 
where pluralist politics are already influential (e.g., the struggling-to-engage or keeping-up-appearances 
patterns). Considering the observed patterns in Table 5, it is also easy to imagine other political patterns 
unfolding under different circumstances. Drawing on Sabherwal and Grover’s (2009) study of politics in 
systems development projects, one may, for example, envisage a tug-of-war pattern in which multiple parties 
with relatively equal power strive to gain control over a BPT project or an empire-building pattern in which 
one instrumentally uses a BPT project as a means to build powerbases. Likewise, it is possible to envisage 
numerous other patterns such as “when the lion prowls, the vultures gather” to describe a situation in which 
stakeholders use the opportunity to assume control when BPT is imposed on a failing department 
(Sabherwal & Grover, 2009). Although we did not observe these patterns at Terma, we acknowledge their 
existence and influence given other circumstances. 
Further, we relate our empirical findings to extant theory on organizational politics to theorize BPT 
implementation politics. Relying on Bacharach’s (1989) definition of theory as a system of concepts and 
variables in which the concepts are related to each other by propositions (Bacharach, 1989, p. 498), we 
summarize our theorizing in a model of BPT implementation politics. The model describes organizational 
politics as constituted through process user responses (expressed through combinations of pluralist, 
rationalist, interpretive, and radical politics) and transformation agent counter responses (expressed 
through combinations of reinforcement, accommodation, persuasion, and confrontation politics) as 
dependent on and impacting goal alignment and goal compliance in a particular BPT implementation 
context. Moreover, we express the relationships between concepts in nine propositions and illustrate 
those in Figure 2 and Tables 8 and 9. 
Our theorizing builds on and extends the IS literature on resistance management. For example, Rivard and 
Lapointe (2012) develop a taxonomy of implementers’ responses to user resistance to IT implementation, 
which comprises four categories: inaction, acknowledgment, rectification, and dissuasion. This taxonomy 
provides a “theoretical explanation of the patterns of relationships observed between implementers’ 
responses and user resistance” (Rivard & Lapointe, 2012, p. 916). However, compared to our contribution, 
their framework is purely descriptive and does not include stakeholder motivation (interests) and response 
strategies (politics). van Offenbeek et al. (2013)’s framework is another example. Their framework links 
acceptance and resistance research and distinguishes between four categories of user reactions: supporting 
users, resisting users, supporting non-users, and resisting non-users. The framework allows one to describe 
and analyze behavior during IS implementation. The authors suggest that one can use the framework “as a 
tool to assess and monitor people’s behaviors during IS implementation and to develop differentiated 
interventions” (van Offenbeek et al., 2013: 447). Meanwhile, the framework does not include perspectives on 
specific implementation strategies responding to user reactions. 
Although our empirical analyses were limited to Terma, we leveraged the possibility of generalizing from 
description to theorizing (Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Yin, 2003). Following Mason (2002), our theoretical 
generalization relies on the quality of our pluralist analyses; “whatever else you do, you should make 
some claims for the wider resonance or generalizability of your explanations which are based on the rigor 
of your analysis” (p. 196). Thus, we not only provide analyses and descriptions of BPT politics but also 
prescriptions to help managers understand and effectively manage BPT politics (Gregor, 2006). Still, our 
theorizing of BPT implementation politics is limited to conditions similar to those at Terma; that is, 
incremental BPT within large, hierarchical, and project-based organizations that focus on developing 
systems and delivering services. Further, our model relates to the application of Bradshaw-Camball and 
Murray’s (1991) perspectives on organizational politics. Their framework, capable of capturing the multi-
dimensional nature of BPT politics, limited our empirical analyses and theorizing to four specific, albeit 
widely accepted, perspectives on organizational politics. 
Considering these contributions and limitations, our investigation suggests interesting avenues for future 
research. Terma’s CMMI-based project provided an opportunity to study incremental BPT in the sense of 
identifying current business problems, adopting step-by-step changes through employee involvement, and 
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implementing new processes based on best practices for systems development. Future studies of BPT 
politics should investigate other approaches to BPT, including radical transformations. One promising 
approach is neo-humanism, a radical humanist view that relates to critical theory (Hirschheim & Klein, 
1989). Future explorations of BPT politics from other perspectives, including a critical perspective, might 
yield additional important insights. 
From a practical point of view, our investigation emphasizes that BPT implementation involves complex and 
highly uncertain activities that challenge existing power relations and that politics is intrinsically tied to BPT 
behaviors and outcomes. BPT managers may draw on our concepts and propositions to understand and 
manage process user responses through transformation agent counter responses depending on the 
organizational context of transformation goal alignment and compliance. An enhanced understanding helps 
managers make better sense of such complex organizational change initiatives and enact interventions that 
serve their interests. Such interventions also benefit from key insights from our analyses of BPT politics at 
Terma. Successful BPT implementation requires creating a political environment in which the deeper 
structure of shared meanings and symbols are consistent with the surface structure of power. Moreover, 
goal alignment does not guarantee successful BPT implementation and divergence of interests does not 
necessarily preclude positive outcomes. When process politics unfolds, outcomes become truly 
unpredictable if left to chance. Hence, rather than taking a passive role and reacting to circumstances as 
politics plays out, we advise managers to proactively maneuver BPT efforts by taking their intrinsic political 
nature into account (Buchanan, 1997; Dhillon, 2004; Keen, 1981; Willcocks & Smith, 1995). 
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Appendix 
To further document our coding of data, Table A1 contains sample expressions related to AES and the 
interpretive perspective on organizational politics. The table links the key concepts from the data analysis 
guide (Table 3) to “example quotations”, which resulted from our having used the coding scheme to 
categorize statements by BPT participants (“Interviewee” in Table 4) for each perspective. The table also 
contains comments and observations (“observed interactions”) that we made during analysis, which helps 
to explain the outcomes. 
Table A1. Sample Evidence of Interpretive Politics in AES (1 of 16) 
Concepts Example Quotations Observed Interactions 
Sensemaking 
“Our project managers have come to realize that the 
BPT project gave them some tools that were actually 
useful” (AES implementation manager). 
 
Sensemaking activities among AES 
managers led them to see the BPT project 
as a solution to the crisis situation in AES. 
 
Symbols 
“Speaking of the cookbook—at one point in time we 
realized that we needed to understand all this, and 
then we established a CMMI guideline for the projects 
to use. We wrote down what it is all about” (AES 
implementation manager). 
 
The AES senior VP became a symbol of 
decisive action. 
 
Social 
constructions 
“I see it as a leap forward that each development 
process has been thoroughly defined… It commands 
greater respect” (AES project manager #1). 
 
As part of social construction, AES 
managers continuously communicated the 
BPT project as the unit’s future. 
 
Organizational 
culture 
“My fear is that having this cookbook will stop people 
from asking: ‘What does all this mean to me?’ and 
make them follow it blindly.... My belief is that, in AES, 
they don’t have the maturity to reflect upon 
processes” (Corporate BPT manager). 
AES management decided to adapt the 
generic processes to AES’s organizational 
culture based on past experiences with 
project managers’ inability to adopt off-the-
shelf processes. 
To further document our use of theoretical framing, Table A2 exemplifies how we linked the primary 
concepts (structure, process and outcomes) of Bradshaw-Camball and Murray’s (1991) framework during 
the analysis of the empirical material. 
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Table A2. Sample Evidence of Structure, Process, and Outcomes 
Structure 
(political 
actors) 
Process 
(how influence is exercised) 
Outcomes 
(ensuing consequences) 
AES senior VP 
Make BPT implementation a 
symbol of a solution to existing 
problems; create vision; use 
authority to apply a standard set 
of implementation steps. 
Achieve CMMI level 2 rating; “[AES management] wants to 
establish checklists and that sort of thing in realization that it is 
the only way to push things through” (Corporate BPT manager). 
AES 
implementation 
manager 
Apply expertise to support 
implementation. 
Achieve CMMI level 2 rating; “the kind of project management 
I’ve seen out here has been diddly-squat… so right away, I 
accepted that this is the tool.” 
ASY senior VP 
 
Focus on maintaining customers’ 
perception of ASY as credible 
market player; Apply persuasion 
as influence tactic. 
Failure to resolve conflicts; lack of business unit leadership 
commitment; scaled-down BPT implementation; “the CMMI is 
non-essential. We would like to have it, but if you ask if I could 
argue that we have lost an order because of it, I cannot.” 
ASY 
implementation 
manager 
Concede to lack of support and 
involvement because of low 
powerbase. 
Recognize lack of power to move BPT implementation forward: “If 
you have a customer who is paying for something, it is a different 
matter. It is easier to postpone [an internal BPT project] even 
though it is equally important in the long run. It is easier to ask for 
absolution. There is no immediate cost of postponing these 
processes.” 
ISY senior VP 
Point to contract negotiations in 
which ISY’s lack of a CMMI 
appraisal had been a problem. 
Achieve desired CMMI level 2 rating; “It is crucial for us to be at 
CMMI level 2 and be able to say that we are in control of what we 
develop… It’s about economic benefit.” 
ISY 
Implementation 
manager 
Answer questions and support 
each project manager individually; 
leverage power derived from 
formal authority and expertise to 
establish project solutions. 
Achieve desired CMMI level 2 rating: “It was the ISY training 
manager and the ISY implementation manager who had already 
planned such an implementation sequence to keep us on track” 
(ISY project manager #4). 
RSY senior VP 
Emphasize that new processes 
might improve project practices, 
but did not provide support for 
BPT implementation; emphasize 
customer relationship and tailored 
processes. 
Conflicting goals; lack of BPT implementation progress; 
conflicting signals; “Do it the other way around [compared to 
BPT]. Let the units optimize each process area themselves.” 
RSY 
implementation 
manager 
Criticize standardization ideal and 
organization of BPT 
implementation project based on 
expertise; Let project managers 
fend for themselves. 
Implementation limited to few projects; conflicting goals and 
confusing situation for project managers; “With such a process 
apparatus, you start out by making a snowball and get it rolling 
and you expect it to yield a positive result somewhere down the 
line. The problem is that you’ll never be able to measure it 
because it will be three years before it is implemented.” 
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